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ABSTRACT  
 
The Commission presented on 13 December 2016 new proposals for amending the 
coordination of social security systems. For frontier workers there should be a shift of 
competence for unemployment benefits: according to the current regulation the country 
of residence is competent. The Commission wants to make the country of former 
employment competent after one year of employment in that country. The Commission 
proposes also the extension of the period an unemployment benefit has to be exported. 
The Commission intends with the proposal to render the coordination rules of LTC 
more transparent and visible for the citizen. In terms of LTC the Commission therefore 
proposes mainly the following modifications: definition of LTC; establishing a detailed 
list of LTC benefits and creation of a new chapter on coordination of LTC. 
 
KEYWORDS: unemployment benefits, long-term care benefits, export of benefits, 
residence 
 
RESUMEN 
 
La Comisión presentó el 13 de diciembre de 2016 nuevas propuestas de modificación de 
la coordinación de los sistemas de seguridad social. Para los trabajadores fronterizos 
debería haber un cambio de competencia para las prestaciones de desempleo: según la 
normativa vigente, el país de residencia es competente. La Comisión desea que el país 
de empleo anterior sea competente después de un año de empleo en ese país. La 
Comisión propone también la prórroga del período de exportación de la prestación de 
desempleo.  
La Comisión aspira con la propuesta de reforma hacer las normas de coordinación de las 
prestaciones de cuidados de larga duración (dependencia) más transparente y visible 
para el ciudadano. Por lo tanto, en lo que se refiere a las prestaciones por cuidados de 
larga duración, la Comisión propone principalmente las siguientes modificaciones: 
definición de la prestación, establecimiento de una lista detallada de beneficios de 
dependencia y la creación de un nuevo capítulo sobre coordinación de esta prestación. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: prestaciones por desempleo, prestaciones de dependencia, 
exportación de prestaciones, residencia  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 e-Revista Internacional de la Protección Social, ISNN 2445-3269. 2017, Vol. II, Nº 2 
http://dx.doi.org/10.12795/e-RIPS.2017.i02.03.  Página 6 
 
SUMMARY  
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
II. UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS  
 
III.  EXPORT OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS  
 
IV.  FURTHER PROPOSALS OF THE COMMISSION  
 
V.  LONG-TERM CARE BENEFITS (LTC) 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 e-Revista Internacional de la Protección Social, ISNN 2445-3269. 2017, Vol. II, Nº 2 
http://dx.doi.org/10.12795/e-RIPS.2017.i02.03.  Página 7 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
The Commission presented on 13 December 2016 new proposals for amending the 
coordination of social security systems.  They concern many chapters of the 
coordination regulations as for example also the rules on applicable legislation and rules 
on how to deal with Article 4 on equal treatment in the light of the recent case law of 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
 
In the following only two, but crucial proposals are outlined critically: the proposals on 
coordination of unemployment benefits and on long-term care benefits. 
 
The Commission´s position is only outlined in so far as to render counterpositions 
understandable. The Commission has published large volumes of information which can 
be consulted on their homepage.  
 
II. UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS  
 
The Commission proposes the following modifications: 
 
For frontier workers there should be a shift of competence for unemployment benefits: 
according to the current regulation the country of residence is competent. The 
Commission wants to make the country of former employment competent after one year 
of employment in that country. 
 
Main argument for such a change is that the country of former employment has received 
the social security contributions from the worker and/or his employer. Now the situation 
is not just, as the country of residence has to pay the unemployment benefits, but has 
not received any contributions. There is a limited reimbursement system which obliges 
the country of former employment to reimburse the country of residence for a certain 
time and thus mitigates the financial consequences for the state of residence. The 
complicated rules for reimbursement of contributions from the former country of 
employment to the country of residence would become superfluous with a shift of 
competence to the former state of employment for paying unemployment benefits. 
 
Before an assessment of the proposal is undertaken, a short review on the status quo is 
given: 
 
The principle under which unemployment benefits have to be provided as a rule by the 
state of residence in the case of frontier workers (category of persons pursuant to Article 
65 of Regulation No 883/2004) has worked well as a fundamental coordination rule for 
over 40 years. No major difficulties have arisen neither for the Member States nor for 
the persons concerned. Minor problems in the implementation of the law can be 
removed either by decisions/recommendations of the Administrative Commission on 
the interpretation of the regulations or by small legal amendments. 
 
In its judgment in Case C-443/11 Jeltes the ECJ explicitly confirmed the principle of the 
state of residence for frontier workers.“The rules on the freedom of movement for 
workers, contained in particular in Article 45 TFEU, must be interpreted as not 
precluding the Member State where the person was last employed from refusing, in 
accordance with its national law, to grant unemployment benefit to a wholly 
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unemployed frontier worker whose prospects of reintegration into working life are best 
in that Member State, on the ground that he does not reside in its territory, since, in 
accordance with Article 65 of Regulation No 883/2004, as amended by Regulation 
988/2009, the applicable legislation is that of the Member State of residence." (no 2 of 
the operative part of the judgment). 
 
A shift to the principle of the state of employment’s competence would be justifiable if 
proof could be established that it would improve migrant workers' rights without 
considerably obstructing major numbers of persons in the exercise of their freedom of 
movement.  
 
There are different situations frontier workers are in. In the following only two 
situations are outlined:  
 
Situation of a frontier worker living “relatively far away” of the border: The question 
arises, if the Commission’s proposal really improves the free movement of workers, if 
the former frontier worker lives further away from the frontier. By definition “frontier 
worker” covers also those workers who return to their country of living regularily at 
least once a week. Therefore also those workers are covered who live far away from 
their workplace and commute - often by budget airlines-home only once a week. 
 
Example: A considerable number of workers live in the eastern part of Germany, work 
in the Netherlands during the week (in slaughterhouses, for example) and return to their 
German residence over the weekend. The workers normally commute a distance of 500 
km (one way) on weekends. If they become unemployed, they register as unemployed at 
their German place of residence and seek jobs in the proximity of their residence. 
 
If the principle of the state of employment applied, the Netherlands would be 
responsible for the provision of benefits, provided the worker has worked there for at 
least 12 months. 
 
The philosophy behind the proposal seems to suggest that the worker prefers to work 
abroad and likes to commute every weekend home to his/her family and there for also 
wants to look for work there in case of unemployment. 
 
But is it not true, that the large majority of the workers concerned would prefer to work 
close to their family, where the children go to school and where most of his/ her social 
environment is situated?  
 
The German residence would be more than 500 km away from a Dutch institution and 
the unemployed persons would suffer considerable disadvantages as a result: 
 
With the proposal the following situation arises: The worker would be required to 
appear in person at the employment agency in the Netherlands at least for his/her first 
registration as unemployed. The travel expenses would have to be borne by him-
/herself. 
 
The question as to whether the employment services of the state of employment would 
have to cover increased expenses for persons whose residence is far away in another 
country has not been tackled in the draft modification. The Dutch institution would only 
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pay unemployment benefits and not provide any supportive services aimed at 
reintegration into the German labour market. It would not cover the costs of work 
familiarisation in a German enterprise, for example. Nor would it finance any further 
training or retraining measures in Germany. 
 
The Dutch employment agency is not knowledgeable about the German labour market 
and would thus not be able to make placement proposals for the German labour market. 
Nor does it know which measures are required to make up for deficits on the part of the 
worker so that he/she can apply for available jobs in Germany which is why the agency 
could not help the worker with his/her reintegration into the German labour market. 
 
The worker concerned would probably be unemployed for a longer period of time than 
comparable workers who receive comprehensive subsistence benefits and benefits to 
help them reintegrate into the labour market from the institution of the state of 
residence. 
 
To shed some more light on this: 
 
Without solutions on how to deal with active labour measures, the proposal is not 
mature to be decided on: 
 
If the state of employment had to finance integration measures in another Member State, 
it would have to be decided whether the integration measures should be designed in 
accordance with the rules of the state of employment or of the state of residence. It 
would have to be avoided that the institution of the state of employment has to pay for 
comprehensive/expensive integration measures (set up by the institution of the state of 
residence) if the national law of the state of employment provides for less 
comprehensive/less expensive measures. Would the institution of the state of residence 
have to carry out monitoring functions to ensure that unemployed persons fulfil their 
duties of cooperation in integration measures (that they regularly attend a retraining 
course, for example)?. 
 
Regardless of the kind of solution that would be chosen to implement the principle of 
the state of employment, there would be the risk that the persons concerned would have 
fewer possibilities for participation in measures because of the much more complicated 
implementation of such measures. As a result, their integration into the labour market 
would be considerably obstructed. 
 
Further Situation/Example: If a frontier worker lives close to the border the shift of 
competence could be justifiable. However, also in these cases the problem of active 
employment measures arises.  
 
Additional elements which need to be taken into account (cost of living; language 
skills): 
 
The shift of competence might be a possible measure to take in closely related frontier 
regions with similar level of costs of living. However, this often is not the case. 
 
Case: the worker concerned worked in a country with low unemployment benefits, but 
lives in a country with high costs of living. Could he/she receive social assistance in his 
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country of residence? Other questions arise, if the situation is vice-versa. The worker 
would receive a relatively higher amount of benefits than workers who never have 
moved into another Member state. For at least 6 months according to the proposal, 
he/she could lead a relatively better life than the “local” unemployed person. His/her 
intention to be re-employed would be low in this time, Also the local employment 
agency would presumably not concentrate too much to find him/her work as the benefit 
is financed by another country.  
 
Another element is the language factor. By far not everybody has high language skills, 
nevertheless the unemployed would be confronted with a foreign placement agency for -
often- the first time in his/her life and in a foreign language.  
 
On top of this it should not be forgotten, the requirement that the worker concerned 
needs to be employed beforehand for 12 months in the country of former work, renders 
the legal situation even more complicated, raises the administrative costs to check this 
and delays the proper case management. 
 
III. EXPORT OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS2 
 
The Commission proposes also the extension of the period an unemployment benefit 
has to be exported from now 3 months with the discretion to extend it up to 6 months, in 
the future to obligatorily 6 months with the option to extend for the whole time it can be 
claimed in the competent country. 
 
1. Positive is that the people concerned have more time and flexibility to look for work 
in the other country.  
 
However, the longer the export period the more difficult it becomes for the competent 
country to supervise the unemployed person. The competence to check the 
“employability” of the person concerned is transferred to the country chosen for longer 
period than now. In order to cope with this the Commission proposes that the labour 
administration of the “guest” country is obliged to inform the labour organisation of the 
competent country every months on the situation. But how is the standard of 
information? Will the guest country help the person concerned as it helps its own people 
also before the background that it does not spend its own money on the person 
concerned? It needs to be presumed that less active labour measures would be granted to 
him/her. 
 
When fixing the length of the export period, account should also be taken of the fact 
that for the institution that is competent to provide benefits, it is only possible in its own 
country to call for unemployed persons to cooperate and to support them actively in 
their reintegration into the labour market (for example, by tailor-made integration 
measures fitting the requirements of the unemployed persons and of the labour market)  
This is why a search for work is often more successful in the state of residence than in 
another Member State. 
                                               
2C. Sánchez-Rodas Navarro “Good Legal Practices in Spanish Law? Clauses Governing Residence and 
the Export of Spanish Social Security Benefits” in: in: T. Velasco Portero (Coord.); Good Practices in 
Social Law .Thomson-Aranzadi. 2015. Madrid.; pp. 23-45.https://idus.us.es/xmlui/handle/11441/47317. 
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The Commission argues- in the general sense- that the unemployment would not cost 
more money, it would not matter if the unemployed person received the benefits for 6 
months or longer at home or abroad. In the light of the arguments given above this has 
to be doubted. It is more probable that he/she can find work in the competent country in 
most cases and much quicker.  
 
As a result, the obligatory prolongation remains doubtful. Many member States now 
never use the extension to 6 months, others apply very narrow measures for discretion 
to prolong. 
 
The solution might lie in a binding catalogue of principles for prolongation to 6 months 
export. 
 
The framework conditions for unemployed persons who want to seek work in another 
Member State differ considerably. By way of example, the following three scenarios are 
described: 
 
-Scenario a): In the country where the person wants to seek work the labour market 
situation is much better than in the state of residence. If unemployed persons with 
appropriate qualifications/language skills/age/etc. make an effort, it will be easy for 
them to find work within three months. 
 
=> An export period of 3 months is sufficient. An export period of 6 months 
could act as a disincentive in so far as workers might initially postpone an 
intensive search for work. 
-Scenario b): In the country where the person wants to seek work the labour market 
situation is somewhat better than in the state of residence. Unemployed persons with 
legitimate integration prospects in the country where they want to seek work normally 
need between 3 and 6 months to find a new job. 
 
=> An export period of 6 months is appropriate. 
-Scenario c): In the country where the person wants to seek work the labour market 
situation is much worse than in the state of residence. Unemployed persons have 
considerably worse integration opportunities in the export country than in the state 
of residence. Still, there are unemployed persons who want to export their benefit 
entitlement into the other Member State for as long a period as possible. 
 
=> The legal entitlement to the export period of 3 months is completely 
sufficient. As a matter of priority, the competent institution should have the 
possibility to integrate the unemployed persons into the labour market in the 
state of residence. 
 
The length of the export period should be flexible and use the concrete situation of the 
job seeker and the concrete situation abroad and in the state of residence as a guideline. 
 
2.  Possible solution 
 
Instead of an obligatory extension of payments a catalogue of criteria could be 
developed with the help of the following key questions: 
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a) Does the unemployed person give reasons for his/her intention to seek work abroad 
(for example, leaving the country together with his/her spouse who takes up 
employment abroad or joining his/her spouse who resides abroad)? 
 
b) Is there a special need in the state of residence (e.g. a shortage of skilled labour) to 
fill jobs with the unemployed person who would like to leave the country? 
 
c) Compared to the state of residence, are the integration opportunities abroad: worse, 
similar, somewhat better or much better? 
 
d) In case of an application for an extension of the export period: Is the person 
concerned likely to take up work abroad in the foreseeable future? 
 
IV. FURTHER PROPOSALS OF THE COMMISSION  
 
Furthermore, the Commission proposes to introduce a period of 3 months of 
employment in the new country before former insurance periods from other member 
states can be taken into account for a claim in the new member state.  
 
Under the current regulation insurance periods from other member States have to be 
taken into account if the person concerned has worked in this country directly before he 
became unemployed. The length of the required pre-insurance time is not specified. 
Most member states require at least 1 day, a very few about a month. As this proposal 
would be less favourable for the unemployed person concerned the Commission also 
proposes that he/she does not need to return to the former country to register 
unemployed and draw benefits from there but can apply in the new country to trigger 
the responsibility of the former country for 6 months with the option of prolongation 
until the right is exhausted. 
 
In favour of the proposal it can be said that it requires a closer relation to the new 
country before this country needs to pay on its own account than in the current 
approach. 
 
However, also this proposal obliges the former country to export without having the 
capability to control. After all, it should not be forgotten, that these benefits are financed 
by the contributions of workers and employers. It is necessary to observe strict rules on 
spending. If the person concerned could be brought back quicker in employment in the 
former country, it is a breach of this principle of prudent spending. With the current 
rules the new country becomes responsible after a minimum period of employment of 
one day in most member states.  
 
Both situations could be manipulated fraudulently. Often workers move home to their 
country of residence when they get unemployed. They forget to apply for export of 
regularly 3 months of unemployment benefits beforehand. Afterwards it is too late. 
Thus they take up employment in order to qualify for social security insurance and 
benefits. With the proposal the work contract could be ended before the 3 months period 
has elapsed. Then the former country of employment would become responsible to pay 
out the benefit and also cover social security as a whole for at least 6 months.  
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In addition this proposal can lead to several continues shifts of competence: firstly the 
new country of employment would become competent - e.g. for pension-, sickness 
insurance; family benefits - and then after less than 3 months the former country of 
employment again. if he/she then finds again employment in the new country, 
competence would shift again. Presumably no administration can cope with this 
sequence of different competences.  
 
The problem behind all of this is that now the unemployment benefit is calculated on 
the basis of the wages earned in country of very last employment. And indeed one day 
or maybe one month or so as a timeframe to calculate the amount of benefits which 
need to be paid then for a rather long period of unemployment is not a just basis. Why 
not introduce objective measures of calculation as for example: the average wage for the 
job in the country concerned could be taken into account as the basis of calculation of 
unemployment benefits for a specified period of employment before dismissal and leave 
at the same time the 1 - day rule as applied in most member States as it is? This could 
help prevent manipulation. 
 
V. LONG-TERM CARE BENEFITS (LTC) 
 
Already the Luxembourg Court of Justice ruled that the German long-term care 
insurance needs to be coordinated in the same way as sickness benefits (C-160/96 -
Molenaar; C-208/207 Chamier-Glisczinski): These benefits intend to improve the health 
and living conditions  and are therefore closely related to sickness benefits with which 
they are closely interlinked in terms of organization.  
 
The Commission intends with the proposal to render the coordination rules of LTC 
more transparent and visible for the citizen. 
 
In terms of LTC the Commission therefore proposes mainly the following 
modifications: 
 
I. Definition of LTC 
 
II. Establishing a detailed list of LTC benefits 
 
III. Creation of a new chapter on coordination of LTC 
 
To I: the new definition of LTC benefits brings a welcomed clarification to citizens and 
institutions. However, there is concern that the definition could go too far and also 
further than the ECJ has intended: a wide interpretation could extend the coordination to 
areas which should not be covered:  As e.g. in many Member States ancillary benefits 
are granted by the municipalities, the municipalities could suddenly be confronted with 
the problem of being involved in coordination. On top of this uncertainty would arise 
which other benefits of a member State could be considered as LTC by the ECJ. 
 
To II: in order to have legal certainty the proposal for a detailed list of LTC benefits in 
kind an/or cash as per member State is welcomed. The only question which arises is, 
whether this list is added as an annex to the Regulation itself or left for the 
Administrative Commission to be established after the adoption of the modified 
regulation. In order to have legal certainty on which benefits are coordinated, a list in an 
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annex to the regulation itself is needed. A list established by the Administrative 
Commission is legally not binding, not even for the administration of the member State 
concerned, not to speak of courts. 
 
In addition it could be considered to extend Article 3 (5) of Regulation 883/2004 in 
order to clarify that also social assistance LTC benefits are excluded from coordination.  
 
Such a list provides clarity as to the existence of corresponding benefits in each 
Member States. What is however uncertain is the relationship between the list of LTC 
benefits and the proposed Annex XII of the Regulation, which is to contain the LTC 
benefits that can be coordinated in accordance with other chapters of the regulation. 
 
To III: there is concern that the introduction of a separate chapter for LTC benefits 
could lead to unwanted changes in the coordination rules. The consequence of the 
introduction of a separate chapter for LTC is that the branch of sickness benefits and 
LTC need to be kept strictly separate in future. The application of Articles 17 to 32 
Regulation 883/2004 mutatis mutandis to LTC benefits as a separate branch of social 
security in its own chapter could lead in some constellations to the splitting of 
competences for sickness and LTC benefits or even the loss of entitlements. To apply 
the provision of the sickness Chapter 1 mutatis mutandis would mean, that each time 
those provisions use the term “benefits in kind” it has to be read as ”LTC in kind”. 
 
For instance, the determination of competence for long-term care benefits relating to 
pensioners, who are the group most likely to be affected, may only be based on whether 
an entitlement to LTC in kind exists in the country of residence. Since 10 Member 
States have no LTC in kind, there may be a change in competences for LTC and a loss 
of entitlements where pensions are received from one of these other 10 Member States. 
 
To make this clearer the following examples are outlined: 
Example for changes in competence 
A pensioner, who resides in Portugal, receives a pension from Germany and Portugal. 
Portugal is competent for sickness benefits in kind [Article 23 REG (EC) No 883/2004].  
Since there exist no long-term care benefits in kind in Portugal as per the list set out in 
Article 34(2) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, according to the Commission’s proposal 
Germany would be competent for long-term care benefits in kind and in cash [Article 24 
REG (EC) No 883/2004]. The pensioner would have the right to long-term care benefits 
in cash exported from Germany to Portugal. 
According to the case-law of the European Court of Justice a person  
- who receives pensions both from his Member State of origin and from the 
Member State in which he spent most of his working life and  
- who has moved from that Member State to his Member State of origin 
can by reason of optional continued affiliation to a separate care insurance scheme 
receive a cash benefit corresponding to that affiliation, in particular where cash benefits 
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relating to the specific risk of reliance on care do not exist in the Member State of 
residence. 
According to the Commission’s proposal the affiliation to the long-term care insurance 
scheme had to be compulsory without an existing affiliation to the sickness insurance 
scheme in Germany. 
Status quo Commission’s Proposal 
Competent for sickness benefits: Portugal Competent for sickness benefits: Portugal 
Competent for long-term care benefits: 
Portugal 
Possibility of continuing to be insured in 
the German care insurance scheme on the 
basis of optional continued affiliation  
Competent for long-term care benefits: 
Germany (compulsory affiliation) 
In case of optional continued affiliation: 
Export of long-term care benefits in cash 
from Germany 
Compulsory affiliation: Export of long-
term care benefits in cash from Germany  
 
Example for loss of entitlements 
A pensioner, who resides in Belgium, receives a pension from Belgium and the 
Netherlands. Belgium is competent for sickness benefits in kind [Article 23 REG (EC) 
No 883/2004]. 
Since there exist no long-term care benefits in kind in Belgium as per the list set out in 
Article 34(2) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, according to the Commission’s proposal 
the Netherlands would be competent for long-term care benefits in kind and in cash 
[Article 24 REG (EC) No 883/2004]. 
In the Netherlands there exist long-term care benefits in kind but not exportable long-
term care benefits in cash. As a consequence the pensioner has to pay contributions in 
the Netherlands, but can neither receive benefits in kind in Belgium nor benefits in cash 
from the Netherlands. So far the pensioner receives long-term care benefits in cash from 
the Belgian institution. 
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Status quo Commission’s proposal 
Competent for sickness benefits: Belgium Competent for sickness benefits: Belgium 
Competent for long-term care benefits: 
Belgium  
Competent for long-term care benefits: 
Netherlands 
Benefits: long-term care benefits in cash 
(Belgium) 
Benefits: No 
 
As a result the introduction of an own chapter of coordination of LTC triggers in many 
constellations a change of the competent member State and new burdens for the insured 
person with regard to access to benefits. This would also in the light of the often elderly 
pensioners who need LTC be a disaster.  
 
To make this a bit clearer, in other words: 
 
According to the current Regulation 883/2004 LTC are coordinated as sickness benefits. 
The member State of residence grants the sickness insurance benefits in kind and also 
the LTC in kind if any: the institutions of the member State of residence are always 
competent for granting sickness benefits in kind as all member States have sickness 
insurance schemes. Therefore as a result only one member State is competent. The 
Commission’s proposal for a separate chapter automatically triggers the consequence 
that if a member State of residence has no LTC in kind it needs to be examined whether 
another member State granting a pension would be competent for LTC in kind if the 
pensioner lived there. As sickness benefits in kind cannot be exported this other 
member State would become responsible for exporting its LTC in cash if any. If there 
are no such benefits, the pensioner would receive no LTC at all. In the case there are 
such benefits in the other member State which pays the pension, the pensioner 
concerned would need a new set of additional forms in order to get these benefits 
exported from this state. 
 
The introduction of a new chapter would also imply more bureaucracy:  the use of a 
LTC-specific set of documents for registration and separate cost-settlement. National 
health insurance providers should be the only institutions in charge with the 
implementation of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 in both areas - sickness benefits and 
LTC - in order to rely on a well-established network of institutions.  
 
All in all, it should be considered whether the objective of making the legal status quo 
more transparent and more user-friendly cannot be achieved better and with less 
disadvantages for EU citizens by laying down specific provisions or references on LTC 
in chapter 1 on sickness benefits in Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.  
  
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The retention of the state of residence principle has its advantages because the state of 
residence principle is a tried and tested principle whereas the concepts striving for a 
shift to the state of employment principle do not provide solution approaches for the 
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fundamental problems of the state of employment principle. Quite a lot of frontier 
workers would lose important rights which they currently have according to the state of 
residence principle if the state of employment principle applied and they would be 
seriously prevented from exercising their freedom of movement. 
 
The obligatory extension of unemployment benefit export is not helpful as in many 
cases not required and could also lead to lose chances on the labour market in the 
competent country. 
 
The 3-months rule of pre-employment before gaining access to employment benefits of 
the new country of employment deteriorates the legal rights of the unemployed and can 
lead to absurd results. 
 
All 3 proposals for modification lead in principle to a deterioration of the free 
movement of workers. 
 
The initiative to modernise the coordinating legislation, especially to make the complex 
coordinating legislation fairer, more user friendly, clearer and easier to enforce is 
welcomed. However, establishing autonomous coordination rules for LTC could appear 
premature at this point. A comparison with sickness benefits shows that all Member 
States did at least provide for comparable benefits in kind as Regulation No 3 and later 
Regulation (EC) No 1408/71 came into force. In contrast to this, LTC differ widely 
across the Member States and follow heterogeneous patterns, which will ineluctably 
cause unwished gaps in coordination and trigger a difficult and bureaucratic situation 
for mainly old helpless people and could lead to a deprival of all benefits under the 
current rules. Certainly, the Commission did not foresee these consequences when 
making the proposals.  
 
